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I. INTRODUCTION
As the world grows smaller and nations become more interdependent, the
likelihood that litigation will involve foreign property, parties, or activities
increases tremendously. To prepare and conduct such litigation, the lawyer
may need to obtain information "located" in a foreign jurisdiction: a person
located abroad may know the information; documents located abroad may
contain the information; or the information may describe conditions or
property located abroad. The question of when relatively burdensome, inter-
nationally-approved methods of obtaining such information must be used
thus becomes more and more important.
Consider a product liability suit for damages in the United States arising
from a defective automobile made in Europe. The plaintiff's lawyer will
want to know how the manufacturer designed the product, whether the
manufacturer selected a more dangerous design to save money, the extent of
quality control in the manufacturing process, and other material informa-
tion. Documents and people with this information, however, may only be
found in Europe.
The problem of how to obtain such information presents conflicts between
the interests of litigants in United States courts and the interests of foreign
states in protecting against encroachments on their territorial sovereignty.
Resolving these conflicts initially requires examining the alternatives avail-
able to a litigant who seeks such information.
First, if a party under the personal jurisdiction of a United States court
can obtain and provide the information, an opposing party may employ vari-
ous discovery techniques. Under the Federal Rules, a party may use inter-
rogatories,' requests for admission,2 oral depositions, 3 and requests for
production of documents or inspection of tangible things4 to obtain informa-
tion from an opposing party.
Second, a party may obtain information by seeking to depose a nonparty
and to have the nonparty produce documents.5 Federal courts have jurisdic-
tion to subpoena a United States national in a foreign country and require
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
2. Id. 36.
3. Id. 30.
4. Id. 34.
5. See id. 30(a), (b)(6), 45(b).
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his or her presence before the court,6 but there may be no basis for requiring
a foreign national to appear before a United States court to testify.7 Thus,
proceedings in the foreign country may be necessary to obtain information
from a non-United States witness. Further, when obtaining information
requires activity in the foreign jurisdiction other than taking testimony, such
as physically inspecting an automobile plant, a proceeding abroad becomes
necessary.
The traditional method of obtaining information from a nonparty is by a
letter rogatory, or letter of request, from the American court to a court of
the foreign state, requesting the latter to conduct a proceeding. 8 The court
may transmit the letter directly or through the State Department.9
The Federal Rules also permit alternative evidence-gathering proceedings
abroad. A party may take depositions before a person authorized to admin-
ister oaths under the foreign state's law or before consular officers of the
United States. 10 Additionally, the court may commission a person to
administer oaths and take testimony abroad.11
II. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
To facilitate and regularize the conduct of proceedings abroad for taking
evidence, without adversely affecting the sovereignty interests of foreign
states, the United States and seventeen other nations have become parties to
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters.12 The states represented at the Eleventh Session of the
Hague Convention on Private International Law negotiated and signed the
Hague Evidence Convention in 1968, following successful negotiation of the
Hague Service Convention at the previous session.13
The earlier Service Convention comprehensively regulates the procedures
for effective transnational service among member states. Parties must follow
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982).
7. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2).
8. See id. 28(b)(3); 6 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 204-25 (1968).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1982).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(1).
11. Id. 28(b)(2).
12. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S.
No. 231 (entered into force for the United States on October 7, 1972), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1781 (West 1982) [hereinafter Evidence Convention]. States that have signed, ratified, or
acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention as of July 8, 1986, are listed at 25 I.L.M. 1020-21.
13. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S.
9432 (entered into force for the United States on February 10, 1969) [hereinafter Service
Convention]. The Hague Conference, a permanent institution, which came into existence in
1893, meets periodically to discuss and draft conventions of private international law.
Amram, A Unique Organization: The Conference on Private International Law, 43 A.B.A.J.
809 (1957). The United States became a full member in 1963. Pub. L. No. 88-244, 77 Stat.
775 (1963).
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the Service Convention "in all cases in civil or commercial matters where
there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service
abroad." 14 United States courts have consistently held that litigants wishing
to serve process in countries that are parties to the Service Convention must
follow the procedures provided by that Convention unless the nation
involved permits more liberal procedures. 15
The Evidence Convention provides methods of conducting evidence-tak-
ing proceedings in foreign signatory states in connection with civil or com-
mercial litigation. During the negotiations of the Evidence Convention, the
United States identified several difficulties with the traditional letter of
request procedure: (1) delays brought about by routing letters of request
through diplomatic mail, (2) unnecessary translation requirements,
(3) unavailability of verbatim transcripts, and (4) other procedural require-
ments of the requesting state. Because of the expense and delay involved in
using letters of request, the United States sought to improve the letter of
request technique and to authorize "less burdensome means" of obtaining
testimony from a witness in a foreign state.16 The Evidence Convention thus
improved the then-existing practice for obtaining evidence in a foreign terri-
tory by (1) simplifying and expediting the use of letters of request, (2) elimi-
nating restrictions on using diplomatic and consular officers in taking
evidence abroad, and (3) introducing the use of commissioners to take evi-
dence abroad.17 The drafters constantly bore in mind, however, that the act
of taking evidence in a foreign country without the participation, or at least
the consent, of the local authorities might violate that country's judicial
sovereignty. 18
The concern for judicial sovereignty reflects the fact that in most civil law
countries the legal system regards taking evidence as. a judicial function
14. Service Convention, supra note 13, art. 1, 20 U.S.T. at 362, T.I.A.S. No. 6638.
15. See DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 287-89 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73, 78-79
(W.D. Mo. 1982); Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 134-38, 608 P.2d 68, 71-75 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1980); Porsche, A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 760-62, 177 Cal. Rptr.
155, 157-59 (1981); Cintron v. W & D Machinery Co., 182 N.J. Super. 126, 135, 440 A.2d 76,
81-82 (1981); Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, 88 A.D.2d 504, 505, 449 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735
(App. Div. 1982).
16. Questionnaire on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, with Annexes, IV ACTs ET
DOCUMENTS DE LA ONZIEME SESSION 27, 28, Hague Conference on Private International Law
(1968).
17. Report of United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785, 807 (1969) [hereinafter United States Report];
Amram, Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, reprinted in Message from the President Transmitting the Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, S. EXEc. Doc. No. A-4, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972).
18. United States Report, supra note 17, at 807.
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rather than an act of the parties. 19 One government exercising a governmen-
tal function in the territory of another without the latter state's prior consent
generally violates that state's sovereignty.20 For instance, an arrest or
seizure by officers of State A in foreign State B without State B's consent
violates State B's sovereignty,21 just as marching armed forces across foreign
State C without State C's consent violates State C's sovereignty.22 On the
other hand, when a person-including a lawfully admitted alien-engages in
private activity in a foreign state, there is generally no violation of sover-
eignty. An American in West Germany or France, like the West German or
Frenchman, can eat, drink, sleep, take pictures, ask questions, engage in dis-
cussions, and participate in other activities without violating the sovereignty
of West Germany or France. Of course, if the individual American violates
the law of West Germany or France, then he or she may suffer the local legal
consequences.
Because the government, through the courts, always participates in taking
testimony in civil law systems, 23 while in common law systems parties often
take testimony with minimal or no court participation, different attitudes
prevail on the question whether taking testimony in a foreign territory vio-
lates territorial sovereignty. West Germany or France could regard the tak-
ing of testimony in its territory for purposes of a United States lawsuit as a
violation of its sovereignty, while the United States would not consider
identical procedures by a West German or French court to violate its
sovereignty.
The drafters of the Hague Convention sought to accomodate such judicial
sovereignty concerns:24
Under the Common Law system the preparation of the case for
trial and the obtaining of the necessary evidence of the witness is
not a function of the judge or of the judicial machinery. It is the
function of the parties and their lawyers, who do so on a "private"
19. Id. at 806; Edwards, Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 18
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 646, 647 (1969); Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other
Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 733, 762-64 (1983); see also Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to
Obtaining Evidence in France for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35, 36-
37 (1979); Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Impact of
the Hague Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW.
465, 466-67 (1983).
20. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1313 nn.67 &
69 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (service of compulsory process); Oxman, supra note 19, at 751.
21. E.g., The Ship Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102, 103 (1815) (seizure of a vessel in
foreign waters is an offense under international law); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 306-07 (3d ed. 1979).
22. E.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 140-41 (1812).
23. See supra note 19.
24. Report of the Special Commission, IV AcrES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA ONZIEME
SESSION, Hague Conference on Private International Law 55, 56 (1968) [hereinafter Special
Commission Report]; United States Report, supra note 17, at 806.
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basis. Under the Civil Law system, the obtaining of the evidence is
a function of the judge or of the judicial machinery, in which the
parties and their lawyers may be permitted to assist, but on a "pub-
lic" basis.
Because of this difference, the act of taking evidence in a com-
mon law country of a willing person, without compulsion, and
without a breach of the peace, in aid of a foreign proceeding, is a
purely private matter, in which the host country has no interest
and in which it does not wish to participate. To the contrary, the
same act in a Civil Law country may be a public matter, and may
constitute the performance of a public judicial act by an unauthor-
ized person. It may violate the "judicial sovereignty" of the host
country, unless official permission is obtained.25
Despite this effort, an important issue of recent concern to lawyers, courts,
and commentators remains: When must courts and parties resort to Con-
vention-authorized methods to obtain evidence abroad? Courts and parties
must rely upon Convention-authorized procedures when (1) an alternative
procedure would violate the sovereign rights of the foreign state under inter-
national law, independent of the Evidence Convention, or (2) an alternative
procedure would violate, or cause a party to violate, the law of the foreign
state, and comity would require deference to that foreign state's law. It may
be difficult, however, to determine (1) what limits international law places on
American court actions or (2) when comity requires deference to a foreign
state's law.
Much confusion arises from careless use of the term "exclusive" when
referring to the Evidence Convention.26 The question is, what does the Evi-
dence Convention exclude? If certain alternatives to Convention-authorized
procedures are illegal, then the Evidence Convention is exclusive of those
procedures. To interpret the Evidence Convention as exclusive of illegal
alternative procedures, however, is not to conclude that the Evidence Con-
vention excludes all other procedures for obtaining information located
abroad.
A. Evidence Convention Procedures to Obtain Evidence
1. Letters of Request
The Evidence Convention simplified, expedited, and improved the reliabil-
ity of the letter of request procedure. Under this procedure, a court of one
state asks the court of another state to secure designated evidence for use in
the requesting state.27 Each state must designate a "Central Authority" to
receive letters of request.28 The Evidence Convention specifies the contents
25. Special Commission Report, supra note 24, at 56.
26. Because of the inherent ambiguity of the term "exclusive," I will attempt to avoid its
use as much as possible.
27. United States Report, supra note 17, at 807.
28. Evidence Convention, supra note 12, art. 2.
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of the letter of request and the language in which it must be written. 29 A
court may request "a special method or procedure," °30 and the requested
court must apply "the appropriate measures of compulsion.., to the same
extent as are provided by its internal law." 31 Thus, unlike before the Evi-
dence Convention, testimony under oath and verbatim recordings are avail-
able,32 and the Evidence Convention assures litigants of compulsory
attendance of witnesses from abroad. 33 Most importantly, contracting states
undertake an international obligation, subject to limited exceptions, to exe-
cute letters of request that comply with the Evidence Convention require-
ments.34 While the Evidence Convention improved and simplified the letter
of request procedures, they remain cumbersome in comparison with Ameri-
can discovery techniques. 35
Because the courts of the executing state carry out letters of request, con-
siderations of judicial sovereignty were irrelevant to the Evidence Conven-
tion provisions amending the letter of request procedure:
[T]he task of the Commission was merely to "improve" the
existing practice, particularly in the areas of transmission, reduc-
tion of formalities, the language and translation problems, the priv-
ileges and immunities of witnesses and the form of the execution of
the letters. No basic questions of legal philosophy and govern-
mental concepts of sovereignty were presented .... The letter of
request... poses no [judicial sovereignty] question, because it is
performed by the judge or his nominee in the State of execution.36
Since the Evidence Convention created an obligation upon contracting
states to execute letters of request,37 there were concerns about the extent of
that obligation, and the contracting parties incorporated provisions reflect-
ing those concerns.38 A letter of request may be used "to obtain evidence, or
to perform some other judicial act," but not "to obtain evidence which is not
intended for use in judicial proceedings."' 39 Privileges available under the
law of the state of execution may be asserted in the execution of a letter of
29. Id. arts. 3-5.
30. T. art. 9.
31. Id. art. 10.
32. United States Report, supra note 17, at 813; Borel & Boyd, supra note 18, at 39;
Shemanski, supra note 19, at 473.
33. United States Report, supra note 17, at 811; Amram, supra note 17, S. ExEc. A at 25;
Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad,
67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 106-07 (1973); Borel & Boyd, supra note 19, at 40; Shemanski, supra
note 19, at 473.
34. Evidence Convention, supra note 12, art. 12.
35. See Platto, Taking Evidence Abroad for Use in Civil Cases in the United States-A
Practical Guide, 16 INT'L LAW. 575 (1982).
36. Special Commission Report, supra note 24, at 56; see also United States Report, supra
note 17, at 807.
37. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 647-48.
38. See generally Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 788-90 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Oxman, supra note 19, at 765-79.
39. Evidence Convention, supra note 12, art. 1.
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request. 4° Under article 12, a court may refuse execution if it "does not fall
within the functions of the judiciary" or if the executing state objects on
sovereignty or national security grounds.41 Article 12, however, also pro-
vides: "Execution may not be refused solely on the ground that under its
internal law the State of execution claims exclusive jurisdiction over the sub-
ject-matter of the action or that its internal law would not admit a right of
action on it."42 Finally, article 23, the most controversial article of the Evi-
dence Convention, permits a contracting state to declare its refusal to exe-
cute letters of request "for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common Law countries. ' 43 The articles establish-
ing these limits do not prohibit individuals, courts, or states from complying
with a letter of request; they merely limit the contracting state's obligation to
comply with a letter of request.
2. Taking Evidence by Diplomatic Officers and Consular Agents
The Evidence Convention's second method for taking evidence is by dip-
lomatic officers and consular agents. 44 Unlike the letter of request proce-
dure, this procedure does not involve the courts of the receiving state. The
judicial sovereignty issue arises because officers of a foreign state take evi-
dence.45 Under the Evidence Convention, the receiving state must give per-
mission before a diplomatic officer or consular agent may take evidence. The
receiving state may grant permission generally or specifically in each partic-
ular case. The Evidence Convention does not require a state to obtain prior
permission when it seeks evidence from its own nationals in the receiving
state, unless the receiving state has declared otherwise. 46
3. Taking Evidence by Court-Appointed Commissioners
The third Convention-authorized procedure is evidence taking by com-
missioners appointed by one state's courts to take evidence in another state's
territory.47 The procedure implicates the judicial sovereignty issue,48 and
the evidence-taking state must first receive permission, unless the receiving
state has declared otherwise.49
40. Id. art. 1I(a).
41. Id. art. 12.
42. Id.
43. Id. art. 23.
44. Id. arts. 15-16.
45. Special Commission Report, supra note 24, at 56; United States Report, supra note 17,
at 807, 816.
46. Evidence Convention, supra note 12, art. 16.
47. Id. art. 17.
48. Special Commission Report, supra note 24, at 56; United States Report, supra note 17,
at 807.
49. Evidence Convention, supra note 12, art. 17.
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Furthermore, the receiving state, in granting permission, "may lay down
such conditions as it deems fit." 50 Finally, a state may partially or entirely
exclude, at the time of signature, ratification, or accession, those provisions
dealing with evidence taking by diplomatic officers, consular agents, or com-
missioners. 51 These provisions further reflect the drafters' concern with pre-
serving judicial sovereignty.
4. Other Convention-Authorized Methods of Taking Evidence
While the Evidence Convention addresses (1) letters of request, (2) evi-
dence taking by diplomatic officers and consular agents, and (3) evidence
taking by commissioners, it also authorizes other forms of evidence taking.
The Evidence Convention expressly allows states to permit "by international
law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than those provided for"
in the Evidence Convention.52 Moreover, states may agree to supplement
the procedures outlined in the Convention. 53 For example, in an exchange
of notes in 1955 and 1956, the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany agreed that American consular officers could take voluntary depo-
sitions of West German citizens, subject to certain conditions.54 The two
countries agreed in 1980 that the exchange of notes remained in effect,5 5
despite the fact that when the Federal Republic became a party to the Evi-
dence Convention in 1979 it made a reservation pursuant to article 33,
thereby excluding evidence taking by consular agents when West German
nationals are involved.5 6 Hence, Convention-authorized proceedings are not
limited to those specified in the Evidence Convention.
B. Interpretation Problems
The Evidence Convention meets its drafters' goals of improving then-
existing practices and respecting judicial sovereignty. Nonetheless, problems
with taking evidence abroad persist. One major problem, beyond the scope
of this article, is the extent to which a reservation under article 23 limits a
state's obligation to execute letters of request.57 A different problem, and the
50. Id. art. 19.
51. Id. art. 33.
52. Id. art. 27(c).
53. Id. arts. 28, 32.
54. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 221-24; Shemanski, supra note 19, at 477.
55. T.I.A.S. No. 9938; see Shemanski, supra note 19, at 477-78.
56. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Falzon, S. Ct. No. 82-1888, at 7-9, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 412, 415-16 [hereinafter Falzon
brief].
57. See generally RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 483 comment h & reporter's note 4 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984); Report of the
United States Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention, 17
I.L.M. 1417, 1421-24, 1427-28 (1978); B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
(CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) §§ 5-35 to 5-38, at 228-51 (1984); Edwards, supra note 19, at 650-
51; Oxman, supra note 19, at 771-79; Shemanski, supra note 19, at 480-85.
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principal concern of this Article, is the extent to which courts or litigants
must employ Convention-authorized procedures in order to obtain informa-
tion located abroad.
III. WHEN MUST PARTIES USE HAGUE EVIDENCE
CONVENTION PROCEDURES?
A. The Argument That Parties Must Use Convention-Authorized
Procedures in Order to Obtain Information Located Abroad
Some lawyers and commentators argue that, when parties can only obtain
information in the territory of a foreign state, the Evidence Convention itself
requires domestic courts to use only Convention-authorized procedures to
obtain, or permit the obtaining of, information located abroad.58 The logic
underlying the argument is that the Evidence Convention represents a quid
pro quo: the civil law states permitted better access to information in their
territory in exchange for the common law states' renunciation of any right to
obtain information by other procedures.59
The argument fails to recognize, however, that judicial sovereignty has
little to do with access to information per se. Judicial sovereignty reflects a
state's desire to prevent usurpation of governmental functions within its ter-
ritory. Thus, if a national of a civil law state voluntarily sends trade secrets
to a national of a common law state, the action may violate certain public
policies of the civil law state, but the action would not infringe upon judicial
sovereignty since no one has taken a governmental action in the territory of
the civil law state. Similarly, if a national of a civil law state is unlawfully
compelled to send the trade secrets by private persons in a common law
state, the actions still would not infringe upon judicial sovereignty, although
they might implicate other national policies, such as the protection of
nationals from illegal duress. In contrast, when foreign courts, other gov-
ernmental bodies, or individuals undertake activities which otherwise fall
58. Bishop, Significant Issues in the Construction of the Hague Evidence Convention, 1
INT'L LrIGATION Q. 1 (1985); Heck, U.S. Misinterpretation of the Hague Evidence
Convention, 24 COLUM. 3. TRANSNAT'L L. 231 (1986); Comment, The Hague Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory
Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1461 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, The
Hague Convention]; see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42,
48-50 (D.D.C. 1984); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222
note 1 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot Coupe, S.A., Super. Ct., Stamford/Norwalk,
Conn., No. CV 80 005 0083 S, July 22, 1982; Gebr. EickhoffMaschinenfabrik u. Eisengieberei
v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 497-501 (W. Va. 1985); RisTAu, supra note 57, § 5-40 at 256.1;
Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from
Non-resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAw. 61, 78-79 (1983); Oxman, supra
note 19, at 758-61; Report of the American Bar Association Subcommittee on the Hague
Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 15-23 (Apr. 18, 1985)
[hereinafter ABA Report].
59. Bishop, supra note 58, at 28-29; Oxman, supra note 19, at 760-61; Comment, The
Hague Convention, supra note 58, at 1481-82; ABA Report, supra note 58, at 22-23.
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within the exclusive power of the courts in that civil law jurisdiction, they
infringe upon judicial sovereignty in a civil law country. For example, par-
ties cannot serve process, hear testimony, or examine private premises in the
territory of the civil state without the participation of a civil law court.
One could interpret the Evidence Convention to preclude such actions, if
not authorized by the Convention, as violations of judicial sovereignty. This
interpretation, however, contributes little to the discussion of the Evidence
Convention; whether or not the Evidence Convention itself precludes such
actions, United States courts should respect the judicial sovereignty of for-
eign states if the actions violate the international law obligations of the
United States.6 The quid pro quo argument supports the proposition that
the Evidence Convention prohibits individuals or organs of one state from
physically exercising judicial authority in another state's territory. Logic
does not require extending this prohibition to exercises of judicial authority
in the United States that result in private activity abroad.61 West German
courts have the same view of judicial sovereignty:
[T]he courts have not yet seen a problem in requiring a defendant
to produce information including that which must be procured in a
foreign country. In special circumstances, the German law also
can procedurally require a party to provide information. In pater-
nity matters, both fines and imprisonment are possible if a party
refuses a blood test. Also, in this context, no differentiation is
made if the party in question is a foreigner or lives in a foreign
country....
All of this has been accepted traditionally without contradiction
in the national practice. Hence, one can conclude that there is no
rule in international public law which limits the authority of
national courts and agencies to require the cooperation of foreign
parties in discovery and to impose sanctions for refusals in so far as
this also can be done in a similar situation to a domestic party.62
60. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 494 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1984); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1306, 1323-24.
61. See Nahas, 738 F.2d at 492-93 n.ll.
62. P. SCHLOSSER, DER JUSTIZKONFLIKT ZWISCHEN DEN USA UND EUROPA
(SCHRIFrENREIHE DER JURISTISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT ZU BERLIN) H.971 45 (1985) (English
summary, references to German text omitted).
The West German Supreme Court has held that an Italian man living in Italy is bound to
give a blood sample when being sued in West German paternity proceedings. The sanction for
failure to give the sample was an adverse fact-finding, in the presence of a pre-established
likelihood of defendant's paternity. Judgment of Sept. 4, 1986, Bundesgerichtshof, IV.
Zivilsenat, W. Ger., [1986] 38 NJW 2371.
The English courts have also recognized that defendants must produce documents located
abroad: "If you join the game you must play according to the rules. This applies not only to
plaintiffs but also to defendants who give notice of intention to defend.... In principle, there
is no reason why [a party] should not have to produce all discoverable documents wherever
they are." MacKinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette Corp., [1986] 2 W.L.R. 453, 460
(Ch.D.) (dictum).
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In addition to the fact that the quid pro quo argument does not support
the conclusion that the Evidence Convention precludes all obtaining of
information from the territory of foreign states other than by Convention-
authorized procedures, other factors strongly argue against such a broad
proposition. The Evidence Convention states no obligation to use the proce-
dures authorized therein. 63 Instead, it only provides for methods of
obtaining evidence from abroad and obligates the signatories to execute or
permit properly initiated procedures. In contrast, the Service Convention,
drafted at the previous session by the same Hague Conference, must be
applied "in all cases in civil or commercial matters where there is occasion to
transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad." 64
The history of the Evidence Convention negotiations contains no informa-
tion to support the finding of an obligation to use Convention-authorized
procedures instead of other methods for obtaining information from abroad.
Indeed, Mr. Philip Amram, United States representative to and rapporteur
of the Hague Conference, assured the United States Senate that the Conven-
tion would make "no major changes" in United States procedure, legislation,
or rules.65 The practice of United States courts of ordering parties to supply
information located abroad clearly preceded the Evidence Convention.66
Mr. Amram could hardly have anticipated "no major changes" in United
States procedure were the Convention intended to put an end to such orders.
Absurd consequences also would result if courts interpreted the Evidence
Convention to preclude a party from obtaining any information located
abroad for purposes of presenting it in court. The defendant could assert
that even telephoning someone in Europe to answer an interrogatory would
violate judicial sovereignty. The obligation would apply irrespective of
whether the plaintiff or the defendant made the assertion that information
was located abroad, and regardless of whether either party was a foreign
national. Since even the voluntary taking of testimony abroad, if not author-
ized under the Evidence Convention, implicates judicial sovereignty con-
cerns, 67 the Convention would bar the voluntary transfer of information
63. See Gebr. Eickhoff, 328 S.E.2d at 500-01.
64. Service Convention, supra note 13, art. 1.
65. S. Exec. Doe. No. 25, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972); Amram, supra note 17, at 11; see
also United States Report, supra note 17, at 820; Amram, The Proposed International
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J. 651, 655 (1969).
66. Oxman, supra note 19, at 760; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 53 (1965) ("A state has power to exercise jurisdiction to order
a person, who is subject to its judicial jurisdiction, to do an act.., in another state"); see, e.g.,
Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204 (1958); Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83
F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12 (D. Colo. 1977); ef C.A.B. v.
Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (administrative subpoena); United
States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968) (grand jury subpoena);
SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (collecting cases).
67. The preparatory materials for the Evidence Convention show that even procedures
voluntarily entered into by the parties in a state's territory may violate the judicial sovereignty
that the drafters sought to protect. For example, many civil law countries object to a foreigner
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located abroad by one party to another. The potential for abuse would be
enormous.
Finally, such a restrictively interpreted Evidence Convention would result
in a violation of the public international law obligations of the United States
whenever a court ordered or permitted the obtaining of information abroad,
even if voluntary, and the party did not follow Convention-authorized proce-
dures. It is inconceivable that any signatory nation intended the Evidence
Convention to have such effects.
Judge Getzendanner noted still other extraordinary consequences of a
preclusive interpretation of the Evidence Convention:
Treating the Convention procedures as exclusive would make for-
eign authorities the final arbiters of what evidence may be taken
from their nationals, even when those nationals are parties prop-
erly within the jurisdiction of an American court. This cession of
jurisdiction not only would apply at the discovery stage, presuma-
bly, but also would allow foreign authorities to determine what evi-
dence may be taken from their nationals at trial, or for use at trial.
An American plaintiff might not be able to call the president of a
foreign defendant corporation as a live adverse witness, and instead
might have to settle for introducing a transcript of the execution of
a Letter of Request abroad.68
One could argue that the Evidence Convention only precludes the compul-
sory extraction of information from abroad, but such a limitation is inconsis-
tent with the very theory that the use of Convention-authorized procedures
is obligatory. The theory behind the argument is that the Evidence Conven-
tion provides methods to obtain information from abroad; therefore, the
courts should interpret the Evidence Convention to require exclusive use of
those methods.69 But the Evidence Convention provides for voluntary as
well as involuntary giving of information. For instance, the Evidence Con-
vention expressly provides for the voluntary giving of testimony to consular
officers.70
Moreover, the attempt to limit the preclusive effect of the Evidence Con-
vention to the compulsory giving of information suffers from the lack of a
definition of compulsory in the Evidence Convention. We may reasonably
assume that an explicit threat of a contempt citation would constitute com-
pulsion. But what about an order that requires disclosure of information but
does not state the consequences of a party's failure to comply, or merely
threatens that the court will deem certain facts to be established 71 or that
taking evidence even from a willing witness. Special Commission Report, supra note 24, at 56;
Oxman, supra note 19, at 764 & n.84.
68. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
69. Bishop, supra note 58, at 25-26.
70. Evidence Convention, supra note 12, art. 15.
71. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (b)(2)(A).
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certain issues will be precluded?72 What about defendants who merely
gather evidence to defend their cases? A United States court order to pro-
vide information on pain of sanctions, such as forfeiting the case, would
seem indistinguishable from shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
once the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, when the evidence to
rebut the prima facie case may only be obtained from abroad. In each situa-
tion, the defendant must obtain information from abroad to avoid losing the
suit in the United States. Clearly no principled basis exists for distinguishing
between a case in which a party must marshal evidence to avoid losing a law
suit and one in which a party is expressly compelled to produce evidence.73
Consequently, construing the Evidence Convention to preclude only the
compulsory transfer of information does little to limit the extraordinary
nature of a preclusive interpretation of the Convention.
Given the difficulties associated with this restrictive view, it is not surpris-
ing that United States courts have regularly rejected such an interpetation. 74
Those courts requiring resort to the Evidence Convention have relied upon
comity, not on any interpretation of the Convention itself.75
In an amicus brief filed at the United States Supreme Court's request, the
United States Government adopted the position that the Evidence Conven-
tion is not exclusive.76 In the Government's view, "the Convention cannot
be construed as absolutely restricting the authority of United States courts to
employ traditional discovery devices specified in federal and state rules,"'77
even if those devices require a "party or witness to comply with a discovery
request under pain of sanctions,"'78 and even "where the party from whom
discovery is sought claims that the information necessary to respond to the
72. See, e.g., id. 37 (b)(2)(B); Shemanski, supra note 19, at 484.
73. Indeed, the French blocking statute, see infra text accompanying notes 115-16, even
though purporting to require resort to Convention-authorized procedures when courts or
parties seek broad categories of information in France for foreign litigation purposes, "does not
have as a purpose the limiting or controlling of the relations of international lawyers and their
clients." J. 0. Assemblee Nationale-Questions et Responses, January 26, 1981 at 373,
translated and quoted in Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L LAW. 585, 596, 612, 614 (1981); see infra text
accompanying note 115.
74. See, eg., Lowrance v. Michael Weinig, GmbH and Co., Kommanditgesellschaft, 107
F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 1985); Gebr. Eickhoff,
328 S.E.2d at 497.
75. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222; Pierburg GmbH v.
Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Volkswagenwertk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981);
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109 Cal. Rptr.
219 (1973); Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Gebr.
Eickhoff, 328 S.E.2d at 505-06.
76. Brief for the United States asAmicus Curiae, Club Mediterranee, S.A. v. Dorin, S. Ct.
No. 83-461, at 3, 23 I.L.M. 1332, 1335 [hereinafter cited as Club Med brief].
77. Id. at 8-9, 23 I.L.M. at 1338.
78. Id. at 6, 23 I.L.M. at 1337.
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discovery request is located in a foreign state that is a party to the Hague
Evidence Convention." 79 United States courts, in deference to the Govern-
ment's views on United States treaty obligations,80 will probably interpret
the Evidence Convention accordingly.
B. The Argument That the Evidence Convention Requires First Resort to
Convention-Authorized Procedures
A second argument is that the Evidence Convention requires first resort to
Convention-authorized procedures.81 While rejected by some courts, 82
other courts have adopted this interpretation-but only as a matter of
comity.83
The Evidence Convention contains no textual basis for the first resort
position. As Judge Getzendanner succinctly explained, it is inconsistent to
insist that judicial sovereignty prohibits certain activity in a foreign country
at one stage of a lawsuit but does not prohibit the same activity at a later
stage: "[T]he greatest insult to the civil law countries' sovereignty would be
for American courts to invoke their judicial aid merely as a first resort, sub-
ject to the eventual override of their rulings under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."84 The first resort interpretation of the Evidence Convention
lacks any textual, logical, or sound policy basis.
C. The Argument That Proceedings to Take Evidence in a Foreign State,
Which is a Party to the Convention, Require Resort to
Convention-Authorized Procedures
Finally, one may argue that international law requires Convention-author-
ized procedures when proceedings are conducted in a foreign signatory
state's territory, but not when domestic proceedings merely result in infor-
mation gathering by a party in the foreign state's territory. 85 In other words,
a United States court may not order an evidence-taking proceeding in the
foreign territory without using Convention-authorized procedures, but a
United States court can undertake proceedings in the United States which
79. Id. at 3, 23 I.L.M. at 1335.
80. E.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933).
81. Professor Oxman argues that a first resort rule should be "gradually evolv[ed]" in
"judge-made federal common law." His policy arguments support his conclusion that "[t]he
agreed [Evidence Convention] procedures should be used," but he provides no clear definition
of when international law requires its use. Oxman, supra note 19, at 794-95. Hence, the
argument is of limited use to a court faced with both the conflicting demands of counsel and
the potential for reversal on appeal.
82. In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d 602, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1985); Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 523.
83. See, e.g., Gebr. Eickhoff, 328 S.E.2d 492; Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 523; see also Anschuetz,
754 F.2d at 613.
84. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 523; see also Anschuetz, 754 F. 2d at 613.
85. Work, 106 F.R.D. 45; Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 517-24.
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result in private information-gathering activity abroad. Under this theory,
the critical question is the location of the evidence-taking proceeding.86
This inquiry satisfies the Evidence Convention's purpose of protecting
judicial sovereignty. Parties and courts must have the host state's participa-
tion or consent to undertake proceedings in its territory if it so requires. But
ordinary activity, such as private information gathering by a party, regard-
less of its purpose, does not require the host state's participation or consent.
This conclusion is congruent with the text of the Evidence Convention.
Nowhere does the Evidence Convention by its terms require its use, and it
would be extraordinary to interpret the Evidence Convention to preclude
information gathering, pursuant to domestic court orders, by methods previ-
ously consistent with international law. On the other hand, to the extent
that proceedings without prior consent in the territory of a foreign state
would violate that state's sovereignty under international law, one can logi-
cally look to the Evidence Convention as providing the only means by which
a contracting state will permit another state or party to conduct such pro-
ceedings. Thus, the Evidence Convention is exclusive not by its terms, but
because it authorizes the only means by which the signatories agree to per-
mit proceedings which otherwise, without consent, would violate interna-
tional law. Article 27 implies this interpretation by allowing contracting
states to permit "methods of taking evidence other than those provided for
in this Convention."8 7 This provision is consistent with the conclusion that
courts need not use Convention-authorized procedures whenever a party
seeks evidence from abroad, but only when actually ordering proceedings in
a foreign state's territory.
This analysis explains the position of the United States government in
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon.88 In a product liability suit
brought in a Michigan state court, the court ordered a consular officer to
take the depositions of West German nationals, employees of the defendant,
in the Federal Republic of Germany.89 The Michigan Supreme Court
denied the defendant's motion for leave to appeal and the defendant sought
review in the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court requested
the views of the United States. 90 The Government's amicus brief stated that
the depositions as ordered were "barred" under the Evidence Convention
because the Michigan court did not order the depositions pursuant to Con-
vention-authorized procedures, including procedures authorized by an
Exchange of Notes between West Germany and the United States.91
86. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 521.
87. Evidence Convention, supra note 12, art. 27. But see Bishop, supra note 58, at 26
(arguing that article 27 of the Evidence Convention precludes all other methods for obtaining
evidence abroad); Comment, The Hague Convention, supra note 558, at 1475-78.
88. 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984).
89. Falzon brief, supra note 56, at 2-3, 23 I.L.M. at 413.
90. 104 S. Ct. 62 (1983).
91. Falzon brief, supra note 56, at 11, 23 I.L.M. at 417.
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Because a consular officer would conduct the depositions, however, the gov-
ernment would simply prevent consular officers in West Germany from pre-
siding over the ordered depositions.92 The Government concluded that
Supreme Court review was not necessary to avoid violating West German
sovereignty.93 The Supreme Court refused to take the case.94
Two sentences in the Government's Falzon brief caused some commenta-
tors to attribute to the Government the position that the Evidence Conven-
tion supersedes all other methods for obtaining information located in a
foreign party state's territory. 95 On its face, each sentence only limits pro-
ceedings in the territory of a foreign state party to the Evidence Convention:
The parties to the Convention contemplated that proceedings not
authorized by the Convention would not be permitted. The Con-
vention accordingly must be interpreted to preclude an evidence
taking proceeding in the territory of a foreign state party if the
Convention does not authorize it and the host country does not
otherwise permit it.96
In light of the factual situation in Falzon, one cannot reasonably conclude
from these sentences that the Evidence Convention prohibits all informa-
tion-gathering not authorized by the Evidence Convention. Rather, one
should read them to mean that the Evidence Convention does not permit
proceedings conducted abroad and not authorized by the Evidence Conven-
tion. Of course, Convention-authorized proceedings include proceedings
permitted by a host state, even though not specifically provided for by the
Evidence Convention.97
The Supreme Court subsequently requested the Government's views in a
case involving the gathering of information in France for the purpose of
answering interrogatories served in a suit brought in a New York court. The
Government declared that the Evidence Convention did not require resort to
Convention-authorized procedures. 98 A United States court order requiring
a party to answer interrogatories in the United States may compel informa-
tion gathering in France. Unlike the testimony-taking proceeding on West
German soil in Falzon, such an order would not infringe upon French judi-
cial sovereignty. The Government distinguished the two cases, albeit in an
unfortunately cryptic fashion:
92. Id. at 11-12, 23 I.L.M. at 417-18.
93. Id.
94. 104 S. Ct. 1260, 1932 (1984).
95. Bishop, supra note 58, at 30-31; Comment, The Hague Convention, supra note 58, at
1479-80 & n.90; see also Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v.
Philips Petroleum Co., No. 81 Civ. 4463, n.5, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1985); RISTAu, supra note
57, § 5-40, at 256.3; ABA Report, supra note 58, at 20-21.
96. Falzon brief, supra note 56, at 6, 23 I.L.M. at 415.
97. See supra text accompanying note 53.
98. Club Med brief, supra note 76.
1986]
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
[T]he statement in the Falzon brief requires clarification to the
extent that it could be construed to mean that the Convention is
exclusive.
We note that the [Falzon] statement was not necessary to our
argument that the trial court's order in Falzon was unlawful. The
trial court in Falzon ordered that employees of a foreign corpora-
tion be deposed in Germany before an American consular officer.
Under established principles of both domestic and international
law, however, American courts are precluded from ordering any-
one to participate in discovery proceedings in the territory of a for-
eign state absent that state's consent, wholly independent of the
Evidence Convention.... Because Germany's consent to such dis-
covery was limited to means authorized by the Convention, the
court in Falzon could order such proceedings in Germany only if
authorized by the Convention.99
Thus, the Government apparently accepted the position that a court may
order proceedings in the territory of a foreign state party only if authorized
by the Evidence Convention, but that Convention-authorized procedures are
not the only means by which a court may obtain information located abroad.
One commentator argues that any order requiring the delivery of informa-
tion located abroad to the United States "necessarily compels certain con-
duct abroad." 100 While that may be true, it does not follow that such
conduct is necessarily public in nature-that only a court may so act under
the foreign law system. Gathering information for a law suit does not
always constitute public activity. As the court reasoned in Adidas (Canada)
Ltd. v. S/S SEATRAIN BENNINGTON:
The discovery here sought does not involve any such intrusion
on French sovereignty or judicial custom. No adverse party will
enter on French soil to gather evidence (or otherwise). No oath
need be administered on French soil or by a French judicial
authority.
What is required of Les Toles on French soil is certain acts pre-
paratory to the giving of evidence. It must select appropriate
employees to give depositions in the forum state: likewise it must
select the relevant documents which it will reveal to its adversaries
in the forum state. These acts do not call for French judicial par-
ticipation. If Les Toles were preparing to bring litigation against
United States adversaries in the United States, it would perform
the same acts of selecting employee witnesses and evidentiary doc-
uments from its files without participation by any French judicial
authority. In no way do those acts affront or intrude on French
sovereignty.101
99. Falzon brief, supra note 56, at 9 n.10, 23 I.L.M. at 1338 n.10.
100. Bishop, supra note 58, at 46.
101. No. 80 Civ. 1911 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984), quoted in Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 611.
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For example, the simple fact that a United States plaintiff has brought suit
may necessarily compel the gathering of evidence to rebut a factual argu-
ment made by the plaintiff. It would be absurd to argue that the Evidence
Convention therefore requires dismissal of the suit.
Still others criticize this interpretation-that only public evidence gather-
ing in a foreign state requires resort to Convention-authorized procedures-
because it permits circumvention of the Evidence Convention. 10 2 Under this
analysis, the Evidence Convention would fall into disuse because courts
would inevitably prefer to obtain information from abroad by ordering par-
ties to produce the information in the United States. 10 3
These fears are not well founded. 104 Convention-authorized procedures
must be used whenever a court or party wishes to question persons located
abroad, whenever such questioning becomes necessary (e.g., because a party
does not control a witness), and whenever a party or court must inspect
documents or premises located abroad.1 0 5 The Evidence Convention also
provides a means for courts to avoid jurisdictional conflicts, such as those
caused by foreign blocking statutes.1 0 6 Using domestic discovery procedures
to obtain information from abroad no more circumvents the Evidence Con-
vention than service of process on an agent of a foreign corporation in the
United States circumvents the Service Convention. In neither case is there
an infringement upon territorial judicial sovereignty.
Thus, the most logical conclusion is that international law requires using
Convention-authorized procedures only when a court or party conducts pro-
ceedings in a foreign territory that would otherwise violate that state's sover-
eignty. The more difficult question is, if Convention-authorized procedures
are not required by international law under certain circumstances, when
does comity mandate the use of such procedures?
IV. COMITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONVENTION-AUTHORIZED
PROCEDURES
While the Evidence Convention may not require resort to its procedures
for a court to obtain information from abroad, a foreign state may seek to
limit the private activity of its citizens in providing information to foreign
courts. For instance, if a statute of a signatory state prohibits the export of
certain information, with an exception for compliance with Convention-
authorized procedures, such a law in effect requires a court in a foreign
country to resort to Convention-authorized procedures to avoid subjecting
102. Bishop, supra note 58, at 46.
103. Comment, The Hague Convention, supra note 58, at 1482-83; Bishop, supra note 58, at
39; ABA Report, supra note 58, at 21-22.
104. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 520.
105. See MacKinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette Corp., [1986] 2 W.L.R. 453
(Ch.D.).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 107-71.
1986]
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
the parties before it to conflicting obligations. An American court faced
with this situation must decide whether to defer to the foreign statute as a
matter of comity.
Comity analysis is not new to American courts. When an American court
contemplates an order requiring a party to violate foreign law, the party may
oppose the order on the basis of international comity. By definition, comity
is not a matter of obligation under international law.107 Therefore, neither
treaty nor customary international law obligates courts to grant comity to
foreign legislation. Nonetheless, in order to foster goodwill, avoid unneces-
sary conflicts, and encourage international harmony, courts attempt to avoid
orders requiring persons to violate foreign laws.108 In particular, a court
should strive to avoid ordering a person to supply information when provid-
ing such information would violate the law of a foreign state. 10 9 Courts con-
sider various factors in determining whether comity should apply.110
Club Mediterranee v. Dorin11 raised this problem in the context of a
French statute requiring exclusive use of Evidence Convention procedures.
Plaintiff Dorin brought suit in New York state court against Club Med, a
French corporation, for injuries allegedly sustained while he was a guest at a
Club Med resort in Haiti from December 1981 to January 1982.112 Under
New York court rules, Dorin's counsel served interrogatories on Club Med's
counsel in September 1982.113 The interrogatories, inter alia, requested that
Club Med: Indicate whether or not Club Med owned the Club Med facility
in Haiti; describe every document in its possession describing such relation-
ship; identify all entities involved in constructing the Club Med facility in
107. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
108. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 66, §§ 40, 53 comment d.
109. Hilton, 159 U.S. 113; Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 345-47 (7th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Vetco, 691 F.2d 1281, 1288-91 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 671
(1981); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901-905 (2d Cir. 1968); see Note,
Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and
Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 877, 877-78 n.1 (1982) (citing
several such foreign laws) [hereinafter Note, Compelling Production]; see also Batista, supra
note 58, at 63-72; cf Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
110. See First Natl Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d at 345-47; Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1288-91;
Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 510-16; RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 57, § 420; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 66, § 40. See generally Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976); Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579,
588-95 (1983); Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982); Note, Compelling
Production, supra note 109, at 887-908; Note, Hague Evidence Convention: A Practical Guide
to the Convention, United States Case Law, Convention-Sponsored Review Commissions (1978
and 1985), and Responses of Other Signatory Nations: with Digest of Cases and Bibliography,
16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73 (1986); Note, Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial Discovery,
38 STAN. L. REv. 841 (1986).
111. 105 S. Ct. 286 (1984).
112. Club Med brief, supra note 76, at 2, 23 I.L.M. at 1335.
113. Id.
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Haiti; state whether Club Med had an operational manual relating to the
operation of the Club Med facility in Haiti; and indicate whether Club Med
required employees to take appropriate shots for typhoid fever. 114
Club Med moved to strike the interrogatories on the ground that they
violated both the Evidence Convention and the provisions of a French stat-
ute, commonly referred to as the French blocking statute. The blocking stat-
ute is apparently intended to stem the export of economic, financial, and
technical information in private hands, rather than to protect French judi-
cial sovereignty.' 15 The statute provides, on pain of fine and imprisonment:
Art. 1 bis. Subject to any treaties or international agreements and
the laws and regulations in force, it is prohibited for any person to
request, to investigate or to communicate in writing, orally or by
any other means, documents or information relating to economic,
commercial, industrial, financial or technical [matters] leading to
the establishment of proof with a view to foreign or administrative
judicial proceedings or as a part of such proceedings." 16
The New York court struck four interrogatories on other grounds, but
rejected Club Med's Evidence Convention argument because "the Hague
Convention proscribes the taking of evidence . . .only in French Terri-
tory." 117 The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion and denied Club
Med leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. 118 Club Med
114. Id.
115. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at'513 n.11.
116. Law Relating to the Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial
or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal Persons, 1980 J. 0. EUR
COMM. 1799, 1980 B.L.D. 285, translated in 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382, 383 (1981), 13 INT'L
LAW. 611 (1981).
The underlying intent of the blocking statute may be to hinder the application by the United
States of its laws to French companies with limited United States contacts and, in particular,
to impede the enforcement of United States antitrust laws. See Toms, supra note 73, at 586,
596; Note, Compelling Production, supra note 109, at 879.
The question of the extraterritorial application of United States laws is analytically distinct
from the question of judicial sovereignty. See Oxman, supra note 19, at 750. To the extent
courts consider extraterritorial applications of United States laws as choice of law questions,
the substantive law that courts apply is a different question from the proper procedure. With
respect to extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, the underlying premise of each case in
which the court considers the Evidence Convention is that the party to whom the court
addresses an order is subject to the court's jurisdiction. If a court lacks jurisdiction, the
question whether the court uses Convention-authorized procedures becomes irrelevant to
disposition of the case. But if an order and the parties fall within the court's subject matter
and personal jurisdiction, respectively, the question of extraterritorial enforcement of United
States laws is necessarily thereby resolved. Where the court exercises its jurisdiction is simply
a different issue. Of course, parties objecting unsuccessfully to the exercise of jurisdiction over
them may attempt to rely on concepts of judicial sovereignty to impede that exercise of
jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying note 172.
117. Club Med brief, supra note 76, at 2-3, 23 I.L.M. at 1335 (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 3, 23 I.L.M. at 1335.
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sought review in the United States Supreme Court, which again requested
the views of the United States. 119
The Government's amicus brief took the position that the Evidence Con-
vention is not "exclusive," and that international law does not require the
New York court to limit itself to Convention-authorized procedures for
obtaining information from abroad. The Government indicated, however,
that compliance by Club Med implicated principles of comity because Club
Med's compliance could violate the French blocking statute, while the
court's use of Convention-authorized procedures would avoid the
problem: 120
[I]n appropriate cases, United States courts should utilize the pro-
cedures established in the Evidence Convention in order to avoid
international friction arising from the enforcement of extraterrito-
rial discovery orders. Thus, where a trial court determines that a
conflict between a foreign blocking statute and state or federal dis-
covery rules cannot be reconciled in a given case other than
through resort to the Evidence Convention, the court, as a part of a
proper comity analysis, should consider whether to require the liti-
gants to proceed in conformity with the Convention.121
The amicus brief added that if evidence is not forthcoming after resort to
Convention-authorized procedures, "the court would retain the authority to
order the litigant from whom discovery is sought, upon pain of sanctions, to
produce the evidence located abroad." 122 Under comity analysis, unlike
under an interpretation of the Evidence Convention requiring resort to Con-
vention-authorized procedures, 123 it makes sense to require only first resort
to Convention-authorized procedures, thus retaining other options for
obtaining information when Convention-authorized procedures prove
unsuccessful. Comity analysis seeks to avoid imposing conflicting obliga-
tions on a party and not to protect territorial sovereignty. Indeed, an appro-
priate factor in determining whether comity requires deference to a foreign
119. 104 S. Ct. 1268 (1984).
120. Club Med brief, supra note 76, at 12, 23 I.L.M. at 1340.
121. Club Med brief, supra note 76, at 13, 23 I.L.M. at 1340. The courts owe less deference
to government suggestions regarding the application of comity principles than to the
government's interpretation of treaties. The executive branch negotiates treaties and therefore
is especially competent to interpret them. Moreover, the political branches have primary
responsibility for insuring United States compliance with its international legal obligations.
See, e.g., O'Reilly DeCamara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1908). These factors do not apply in
the context of comity, which does not involve international legal obligations and focuses
primarily on avoiding conflicting obligations upon private parties. Some deference to the
Government's views is appropriate, however, because comity serves to avoid international
tensions, and the conduct of foreign relations is the responsibility of the executive branch.
122. Club Med brief, supra note 76, at 13, 23 I.L.M. at 1340.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
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law is the extent to which the domestic court may achieve its goals without
violating the law of the foreign state. 124
Furthermore, the amicus brief suggested that the New York courts failed
to balance the pertinent interests, that it would be inappropriate for the
United States Supreme Court to balance those interests in the first
instance, 125 and that the Supreme Court should therefore decline review.1 26
The Supreme Court refused to take the case.127
Club Med is significant because it provides the paradigm for requiring the
interest balancing appropriate under a comity analysis. Whether or not such
comity analysis would ultimately require deference to the French blocking
statute is a distinct question that the government did not address, although
comity analysis is extensively treated in the reporters.128
It is not always easy, however, to determine when a comity analysis is
necessary in the first place. Is a comity analysis required in the absence of a
foreign statute requiring resort to Convention-authorized procedures? Must
a foreign state wishing to limit information flow pass a statute similar to the
French blocking statute in order to force a United States trial court to apply
a comity analysis before ordering a party to provide information from
abroad? The facts of In re Anschuetz & Co. 129 present this question.
The plaintiff brought this admiralty suit in federal district court following
a collision on the Mississippi River.' 30 Defendant Compania Gijonesa de
Navegacion S.A. filed a third party claim against Anschuetz, a West Ger-
man corporation, alleging that the failure of a steering device designed by
Anschuetz was a contributing cause of the accident.' 31 Anschuetz objected
on Evidence Convention grounds to discovery orders by the district court
requiring Anschuetz to produce, in the United States, documents then
located in West Germany. Anchuetz, a party defendant, also objected on
the same grounds to Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of its representatives residing
in West Germany.1 32 Anschuetz unsuccessfully sought protective orders
from the district court and subsequently petitioned the court of appeals for a
124. RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 57, § 420(1)(c); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 66, § 40(e).
125. Club Med brief, supra note 76, at 14, 23 I.L.M. at 1341.
126. Id. at 14-15, 23 I.L.M. at 1341.
127. 105 S. Ct. 286 (1984). The lack of an international law question may have influenced
the Court's decision. The Supreme Court has a special responsibility to insure compliance
with international law by the United States, cf THE FEDERALIST, No. 80, at 536 (A.
Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), but the Court does not correct every wrong decision with
respect to the rights of parties. See S. CT. R. 17.
128. See supra note 110.
129. 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17,
1985) (No. 85-98).
130. Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 604.
131. Id.
132. Joint letter from Counsel for Gijonesa and Anschuetz (May 18, 1984), quoted in Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, In re Anschuetz, 5th Cir. No. 84-3286, at 6-7 (1984)
[hereinafter Anschuetz brief].
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writ of mandamus. The Fifth Circuit requested the views of both West Ger-
many and the United States. 133
The West German Government filed an amicus brief arguing that oral
depositions in West Germany and production of documents located there
would violate West German sovereignty unless the court transmitted the
order by the Evidence Convention letter of request method. 134
The United States' amicus brief treated the orders regarding the deposi-
tions and the production of documents separately. With respect to the depo-
sitions on West German soil, the United States, relying on its Falzon 135 and
Club Med briefs, 136 took the position that the courts could not order such
depositions without resort to Convention-authorized procedures. 137 As for
the order of production of documents, the United States reiterated its posi-
tion in Club Med that the Convention is not exclusive, but suggested that
interest balancing under a comity analysis would be appropriate on
remand. 138 No West German law or regulation requiring resort to the Evi-
dence Convention, however, existed to trigger a comity analysis. Instead,
according to the United States, the West German Government's statement
in its amicus brief that the document production order violated West Ger-
man sovereignty was sufficient to require a comity analysis. 139
The Fifth Circuit thanked both governments for their views 140 and then
steered its own course. The court rejected Anschuetz's argument that
obtaining information in West Germany required resort to Convention-
authorized procedures.141 Nonetheless, "the exercise of judicial power
should be tempered by a healthy respect for the principles of comity. ' 142
The court noted the absence of a West German blocking statute and referred
to the statement in the West German amicus brief that the document pro-
duction order would violate West German sovereignty. In what looks
almost like an omission, the court said nothing about whether the West Ger-
man statement required a balancing of interests under a comity analysis.
As for the taking of depositions, the court apparently took the United
States' position: "the Hague Convention is to be employed with the involun-
tary deposition of a party conducted in a foreign country," but need not be
employed in the case of involuntary depositions on United States soil. 143
133. 754 F.2d at 605.
134. Id.; Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae, In re Anschuetz,
5th Cir. No. 84-3286, at 8 (1984). Compare Schlosser, supra note 62.
135. See supra text accompanying note 91.
136. See supra note 109.
137. Anschuetz brief, supra note 132, at 9-11.
138. Id. at 7-9.
139. Id. at 8-9.
140. 754 F.2d at 605 n.5.
141. Id. at 606-14; see supra text accompanying notes 47-68.
142. 754 F.2d at 614.
143. Id. at 615.
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Ordering the district court to reconsider its ruling accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit refused to issue a writ of mandamus. 44
The court's additional suggestion that a court can order voluntary deposi-
tions in West Germany as an alternative to involuntary depositions in the
United States14 5 is questionable; a court should refrain from ordering any
proceeding, whether voluntary or involuntary, in a foreign country when
such action would violate that country's judicial sovereignty. The history of
the Evidence Convention negotiations indicates that even voluntary proceed-
ings (e.g., a voluntary deposition before a consular officer) in the territory of
a foreign state, without that foreign state's consent, may violate the judicial
sovereignty of that state. 146 As applied to Evidence Convention parties,
such consent extends only to Convention-authorized procedures. While the
Evidence Convention may authorize certain procedures only if the parties
consent,14 7 this authorization does not constitute blanket consent by each
state party to voluntary proceedings in its territory. Indeed, this authoriza-
tion implies the opposite conclusion. That is, the provision of specific Con-
vention-authorized procedures for taking evidence "without compulsion"
suggests that judicial sovereignty requires the territorial state's consent in at
least some cases of voluntary proceedings. Finally, the Fifth Circuit's sug-
gestion suffers from the lack of a satisfactory definition of voluntary. Deter-
mining the meaning of voluntary is no less problematic than discovering the
definition of compulsory.14 8
Subsequently, in In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH,14 9 the Fifth
Circuit upheld an order for production of documents located in West Ger-
many and an order to depose a West German company's employees in the
United States. The Messerschmitt court held that because the parties would
conduct the depositions on United States soil, "[t]he order therefore does not
implicate the comity considerations addressed in Anschuetz."'150 Referring
to the amicus briefs fied by West Germany and the United States in
Anschuetz, the court conducted a brief comity analysis on the document pro-
duction order. 151 Since the order did "not require any governmental action
144. Id. at 615-16.
145. Id. at 608 n.13.
146. See supra text accompanying note 25.
147. See, e.g., Evidence Convention, supra note 12, arts. 15, 16.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. The Fifth Circuit appeared to retreat from
its own suggestion that courts or parties could conduct voluntary depositions in West
Germany outside of Convention-authorized procedures. In approving depositions in the
United States, the court stated: "Were the witnesses to be deposed in Germany, other
considerations would be applicable. The Hague Convention provides convenient procedures
for taking witnesses' depositions in Germany without unnecessarily offending German
sovereignty." In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, 733 (5th Cir. 1985).
149. 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17,
1985) (No. 85-99). The Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing
the United States' views in this case. 54 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1985) (No. 85-99).
150. 757 F.2d at 733.
151. Id. at 731-32.
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in Germany, any appearance in Germany of foreign attorneys, or any pro-
ceedings in Germany," the order "balance[d] appropriately the considera-
tions involved."'152 If the absence of a violation of judicial sovereignty,
without more, means that comity does not require resort to the Evidence
Convention, then comity comes into play only when an international obliga-
tion would require Convention-authorized procedures. Thus, assuming
international law never permits outright violations of judicial sovereignty,
the Fifth Circuit effectively made comity irrelevant while purporting to
apply it.
The Fifth Circuit opinions give little guidance on questions of when or
how courts should undertake a comity analysis. The court did reject the
position that comity automatically requires use of Convention-authorized
procedures whenever parties seek information from the territory of a party
to the Convention. 153 This analysis makes sense. Comity in theory is a mat-
ter of giving deference to foreign prescriptions in order to avoid conflicts
among states and conflicting obligations upon individuals. As the Fifth Cir-
cuit stated, "comity is largely a function of the relative interests between
overlapping jurisdictions."' 5 4 In the absence of evidence that domestic court
actions will violate judicial sovereignty abroad, a party cannot invoke comity
without demonstrating that it faces conflicting obligations if it complies with
a discovery order.
The West German company in Messerschmitt sought Supreme Court
review, 155 and again the Supreme Court sought the views of the United
States. 156 The United States took the position that the Fifth Circuit opin-
ions, "while containing some troublesome language, are essentially cor-
rect."' 157 The amicus brief filed by the Government restated the view that
the Convention is not the sole avenue for obtaining foreign evidence. 158
Noting that the Evidence Convention "nonetheless remains a valuable and
workable mechanism for obtaining evidence abroad," the Government
argued that principles of comity should guide a court's decision to employ
the Convention "in any particular situation."' 159 The Government failed,
however, to explain when a court must apply comity and thus provided little
guidance on that issue.
The Government found the Fifth Circuit's comity discussions "rather cur-
sory," but concluded that the decisions were "ultimately correct."' 160 The
152. Id. at 732.
153. 754 F.2d at 608-12.
154. Id. at 608-09; see also ABA Report, supra note 58, at 39.
155. 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (1985).
156. 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
157. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi
River Bridge Authority, S. Ct. Nos. 85-98 & 85-99, at 6, 25 I.L.M. 803, 808.
158. Id. at 8-11, 25 I.L.M. at 809-11.
159. Id. at 11, 25 I.L.M. at 811.
160. Id. at 13, 25 I.L.M. at 812.
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Government relied upon the "relatively limited" West German sovereignty
interest (there was no discovery on West German territory) and the absence
of any blocking statute or possible violation of a "content-based" restriction
upon the disclosure of information to foreign sources. 161 On the other hand,
the United States had a "substantial interest in affording litigants in its
courts adequate opportunities to discover the pertinent facts surrounding
their claims." 162 The Government accordingly recommended that the
Supreme Court deny review.1 63
While the Supreme Court has not granted the certiorari petitions in
Anschuetz and Messerschmitt,164 it recently granted certiorari to review the
Eighth Circuit's decision in In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospa-
tiale.165 This case involves victims of an Iowa aircraft accident who sued the
French designer and manufacturer of the aircraft. A federal magistrate
ordered the defendants to comply with the plaintiffs' interrogatories,
requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents. The
defendants sought a writ of mandamus from the Eighth Circuit.166 Relying
upon the Fifth Circuit opinions in Anschuetz and Messerschmitt, the court of
appeals concluded: "[T]he Hague Convention does not apply to the discov-
ery sought in this case 'because the proceedings are in a United States court,
involve only parties subject to that court's jurisdiction, and ultimately con-
cern only matters that are to occur in the court's jurisdiction, not
abroad.' "167 The court also held that international comity does not require
first resort to Convention-authorized procedures. 168
In response to the defendant's argument that compliance with the magis-
trate's order would require violation of the French blocking statute, the
Eighth Circuit held that the magistrate properly balanced the interests in
deciding-at least prior to the imposition of sanctions for noncompliance-
to order the defendants to comply with the plaintiffs' discovery requests. 169
The Supreme Court in Societe Nationale may finally resolve the issue of
the exclusivity of the Evidence Convention and provide important comity
analysis guidelines. The existence of the French blocking statute in Societe
Nationale makes it unlikely, however, that the Court will address the ques-
tion whether international law requires a comity analysis when a party is not
subject to conflicting obligations.
161. Id. at 14-15, 25 I.L.M. at 812-13.
162. Id. at 16, 25 IL.M. at 813.
163. Id. at 20, 25 I.L.M. at 815.
164. The Supreme Court originally granted certiorari in Messerschmitt, 106 S. Ct. 1633
(U.S. Apr. 21, 1986), but subsequently vacated that order, 54 U.S.L.W. 3809 (U.S. June 10,
1986) (No. 85-99).
165. 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986), cerL granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3809 (U.S. June 9, 1986) (No.
85-99).
166. 782 F.2d at 122-23.
167. Id. at 125 (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 125-26.
169. Id. at 126-27.
1986]
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
A party can easily prove conflicting obligations arising from a blocking
statute. In the absence of such a statute, a court should require a showing of
at least some adverse effect upon a complying party that results from the
policies of the government. Thus, a showing that compliance with discovery
orders of a United States court would cause a party to pay higher taxes or
preclude a party from government contracts would trigger the same comity
analysis employed in Club Med. Without such a showing, however, it would
be difficult to say exactly what a court is deferring to in the exercise of a
comity analysis. 170 Requiring a comity analysis without such a showing
would encourage obstructive tactics by parties opposing discovery.
In its amicus brief at the appellate level in Anschuetz, the United States
took the position that a statement in the West German Government's ami-
cus brief triggered the comity analysis. 171 This position neglects several
important factors: (1) foreign governments are often unfamiliar with United
States judicial processes, (2) some foreign governments are better equipped
than others to monitor lawsuits involving their nationals in the United
States, and (3) slow action by distant governments in obtaining local counsel
to prepare and present amicus papers will result in delays in proceedings or,
as in Anschuetz, after-the-fact changes in circumstances affecting the validity
of a discovery order. These problems militate against requiring a comity
analysis simply because a foreign state flies an amicus brief.
Moreover, a foreign state ministry unhappy with the very exercise of long-
arm jurisdiction by a United States court over one of its nationals-or a
foreign government motivated by domestic political considerations-may
also retain legal counsel in the United States to file a brief and thereby
attempt to mitigate the exercise of United States jurisdiction.172 American
lawyers could easily parrot the West German Government's language in
Anschuetz, asserting that the foreign government they represent views partic-
ular discovery orders as violations of its judicial sovereignty. The assertion
of comity in this procedural context is an inappropriate method of counter-
acting perceived excesses in the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Even if
American long-arm jurisdiction concepts are excessive from the European
perspective, the question of permissible procedures is analytically distinct
from the question of jurisdiction over the parties in the first place. 173 If
more civil law states make extravagant claims of infringement on their judi-
cial sovereignty in order to resist a court's exercise of jurisdiction, American
courts will become more inclined to reject such sovereignty considerations.
170. See Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d 729 (the court appeared to face the same problem of
determining what it was deferring to in comity analysis).
171. Anschuetz brief, supra note 132, at 8-9. It should be noted that Anschuetz, for
instance, contested personal jurisdiction prior to the discovery disputes dealt with by the court
of appeals.
172. See Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 604 & n.3.
173. See supra note 115.
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Even otherwise legitimate sovereignty claims, as in the case of ordering pro-
ceedings abroad, may suffer in the process. Undertaking a comity analysis
because a foreign government has filed an amicus brief encourages foreign
governments to make such claims.
Most recently, in its amicus brief on the merits filed in Societe Nationale,
the United States Government has taken the position that a comity analysis
is required "whenever a foreign litigant from a signatory nation (where the
evidence is located) timely and clearly articulates his country's objections to
the use of American discovery methods." 174 In other words, a court must
undertake an explicit comity analysis in virtually1 75 every case in which one
is demanded, on pain of reversal. In balancing the interests, the foreign
interest that the Government suggests a court must weigh is "judicial sover-
eignty." 176 But in discussing how much weight should be given to that
interest, the amicus brief reasserts the "established American principle" that
a United States court may order a foreign national, properly subject to the
court's jurisdiction, to produce evidence located abroad.177 If so, in many
cases there may be nothing left to weigh. What is the point of requiring an
empty comity analysis? 178
A comity analysis should instead be triggered by a showing that the law or
policy of a foreign state will adversely affect a party if that party complies
with a discovery request to which it objects. Such a showing provides the
court with something concrete to weigh in the balancing of interests neces-
sary to a proper comity analysis. The court can more easily weigh such
factors as the extent to which the order actually implicates the interests of
the foreign state179 and the extent and nature of the hardships a discovery
order would impose on the individual party.180
V. CONCLUSION
International law as implemented by United States courts requires resort
to Evidence Convention-authorized procedures only when a court-ordered
action would otherwise violate the judicial sovereignty of a foreign signatory
174. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. District Court, S. Ct. No. 85-1695, at 19.
175. The formulation fails to give domestic litigants the right to demand a comity analysis,
for no reason related to judicial sovereignty.
176. Societe Nationale brief, supra note 174, at 22-26.
177. Id. at 23. The Government also advocated caution when a party opposes a discovery
order on the basis of a blocking statute. Id. at 24-25.
178. An order requiring that a foreign citizen be deposed on a foreign nation's soil would,
according to the Government's latest brief, "work a greater affront to that nation's 'territorial
integrity' than [for example] requiring a foreign corporation doing business here to make
admissions." Id. at 25. Since such an order would violate a foreign state's sovereignty and
thus violate international law, the court should simply not allow it. This principle is weakened
by merely treating it as an interest to be weighed in a comity analysis.
179. See RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 57, § 420(1)(c).
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 66, § 40(b).
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state. Generally, a violation of judicial sovereignty occurs when a court
orders proceedings in a foreign state's territory without that state's permis-
sion. On the other hand, the Evidence Convention does not preclude court
actions which do not impinge on judicial sovereignty, such as a court order
requiring a party in the United States to take private action abroad to obtain
information.
Other foreign governmental interests, however, may limit the ability of
parties to undertake such private actions abroad. Exactly when a court
should defer to such interests is less clear. If a United States discovery order
would subject a party to conflicting obligations, the United States court
should undertake a comity analysis and carefully balance the domestic inter-
est in obtaining the information against the foreign interest underlying the
conflicting obligation. In the absense of such conflicting obligations, a com-
ity analysis may be unnecessary.
